Issue #22502 has been updated by matz (Yukihiro Matsumoto). I don't think this is a binary choice. Our goal is that compiling any string into a Regexp never crashes the interpreter. Memory corruption caused by a pattern is a bug, and we will fix it. Whether a particular bug is treated as a vulnerability should be judged case by case, depending on its severity. However, a goal is not a guarantee. So the documentation should clearly say that passing untrusted input as a regexp pattern is generally not recommended, in `Regexp.new` and `doc/security/security.rdoc`. The same applies to methods that compile a String argument, such as `String#match`. I don't plan to change the API or the syntax for this, such as deprecating interpolation in Regexp literals. Documentation is enough. Regarding CVEs for the recent fixes, I leave the decision to the security team. Matz. ---------------------------------------- Misc #22502: Clarify whether compiling an untrusted string into a Regexp is supported https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/22502#change-120126 * Author: k0kubun (Takashi Kokubun) * Status: Closed * Assignee: matz (Yukihiro Matsumoto) ---------------------------------------- ## Proposal Decide whether compiling an untrusted string into a Regexp is a supported use case, and document the decision. * If it's not supported: * Document it in `Regexp.new` and [doc/security/security.rdoc](https://docs.ruby-lang.org/en/master/security/security_rdoc.html), like `Marshal.load` and `eval`. * Treat memory corruption bugs that only untrusted patterns can trigger as normal bugs. * If it's supported: * Treat such bugs as vulnerabilities. * Request CVEs for the recent fixes: [#13332](https://github.com/ruby/ruby/pull/13332), [#19020](https://github.com/ruby/ruby/pull/19020), and [#16801](https://github.com/ruby/ruby/pull/16801). ## Background * Ruby 4.0.9, 3.4.12, and 3.3.13 fixed Regexp compilation bugs that led to RCE on GitLab. GitLab assigned CVEs to them, but we haven't requested CVEs for Ruby itself. See [the announcement](https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2026/10/23/regexp-fixes-for-gitlab-cves/). * The current documentation is not clear about it: * The [CVE-2022-28738 advisory](https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2022/04/12/double-free-in-regexp-compilati...) says "in general, it is considered unsafe to create and use a Regexp object generated from untrusted input", but we still assigned a CVE to it. We did the same for CVE-2024-27282. * [The Regexp documentation](https://docs.ruby-lang.org/en/master/Regexp.html#class-Regexp-label-Timeouts) mentions untrusted sources only for DoS, and recommends `Regexp.timeout`. * It's not only `Regexp.new` and `/#{...}/`. `String#match` and `String#match?` also compile a String argument, e.g. `"str".match?(user_input)`. -- https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/